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Abstract—Context: System Theoretic Process Analysis for Pri-
vacy (STPA-Priv) is a novel privacy risk elicitation method using
a top down approach. It has not gotten very much attention but
may offer a convenient structured approach and generation of
additional artifacts compared to other methods. Aim: The aim of
this exploratory study is to find out what benefits the privacy risk
elicitation method STPA-Priv has and to explain how the method
can be used. Method: Therefore we apply STPA-Priv to a real
world health scenario that involves a smart glucose measurement
device used by children. Different kinds of data from the smart
device including location data should be shared with the parents,
physicians, and urban planners. This makes it a sociotechnical
system that offers adequate and complex privacy risks to be
found. Results: We find out that STPA-Priv is a structured
method for privacy analysis and finds complex privacy risks. The
method is supported by a tool called XSTAMPP which makes the
analysis and its results more profound. Additionally, we learn that
an iterative application of the steps might be necessary to find
more privacy risks when more information about the system is
available later. Conclusions: STPA-Priv helps to identify complex
privacy risks that are derived from sociotechnical interactions
in a system. It also outputs privacy constraints that are to be
enforced by the system to ensure privacy.
I. INTRODUCTION
The increasing importance of privacy is relevant for organi-
zations and individuals in a connected world. Especially for
upcoming electronic health systems that are enabled by Internet
of Things devices. Such complex socio-technical software
systems offer personalized services, personal assistants, and
cloud services. Collecting and processing personal information
is essential for those services. According to a Gartner forecast
[1] the Internet of Things, as in everything from your toothbrush
over your freezer to your television is connected to the
Internet, will encompass 26 billion devices by 2020. Each
of these devices will have different sensors ranging from a
camera, microphone, and GPS sensors to more unfamiliar
ones like motion, temperature and light sensors (and even
more specific ones). As multiple devices have these sensors
and they send the collected data usually to at least one
This is the author’s version of the work published at the Requirements
Engineering Conference Workshops (REW), 2017 IEEE 25th International
(https://doi.org/10.1109/REW.2017.30).
c© 2017 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from
IEEE must be obtained for all other users, including reprinting/ republishing
this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective
works for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted
components of this work in other works.
service provider it is unknown on what basis this data is
analyzed and related to other information. The research project
PATRON (Privacy in Stream Processing) funded by the Baden-
Wu¨rttemberg Stiftung works on concealing privacy relevant
patterns in data streams. It is important to find relevant privacy
vulnerabilities to derive patterns. Previous analysis techniques
appear to be non-systematic when it comes to the combination
of data and interaction with the environment. For example with
multiple data receivers that are not part of the original system.
Safety and security can be considered a system property and
system-theoretic approaches are being used as alternatives to
established methods in their field. Privacy can also be seen as
a system property as privacy relevant data can be leaked at all
abstraction levels. Therefore we expect that system-theoretic
methods can be applied with good results to privacy as well.
The currently proposed STPA-Priv method by Shapiro [2] has
not been getting a lot of attention and we want to explore if it
is feasible to use the method for privacy analysis.
II. RELATED WORK
Data-flow analysis techniques have been developed to track
data flow and elicit privacy risks. The approach described by
Lu and Li [3] includes different existing data-flow analysis-
techniques such as ”conditional flow identification” and ”joint
flow tracking”. They implemented a system that analyzes
Android application-files for malicious data-flow. This includes
revealing contacts, call logs, browser history, Short Message
Service (SMS) history, Global Positioning System (GPS), or
unique user IDs. A similar system for iOS applications has
been developed by Egele and Krueger [4]. Their system is able
to detect data-flow in compiled Objective-C binaries, similar to
Lu and Li’s approach. Another interesting approach has been
developed by Enck and Gilbert [5]. Their system can analyze
data-flow in Android applications in real-time, in contrast to
the static approach of Lu, Li, Egele, and Krueger. Their system
TaintDroid can be run on productive devices in the background
to spot malicious app requests.
Analyzing data flow, such as suggested by Lu and Li [3],
Egele and Krueger [4], and Enck and Gilbert [5], focuses on
data sharers, data observers and data exchanged between them.
However, these three approaches are optimized for mobile
applications and only consider access to initial information
sources, such as contact information but do not elicit privacy
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risks that can occur with data that has been exchanged with
other systems or participants. They do not consider what
happens with these information outside of their scope. In many
cases, it is necessary to exchange information for a service to be
able to work as expected. The revealing of privacy information
is not always a privacy risk. Later on when data is exchanged
with other partners or combined with other data sets privacy
risks can occur as well which would not be covered by these
approaches.
Another example for data-flow analysis is the LINDDUN
methodology, described by Wuyts, Scandariato and Joosen [6].
Their approach uses a data flow diagram as a starting point
to find privacy threats. A privacy threat catalog is then used
to categorize each entity of the diagram into seven possible
threat categories: linkability, identifiability, non-repudiation,
detectability, information disclosure, unwareness, and non-
compliance (hence the name LINDDUN). The model goes
even further and describes a process to resolve privacy threats.
However, it is difficult to analyze complicated socio-technical
systems using this approach, because it is focused on a bottom-
up data flow analysis. Privacy risks often result from human
interaction or interactions with different systems which makes
it difficult for bottom-up analysis techniques to unveil these.
Indeed, this is a drawback of this approach that has been
proven by Wuyts, Scandariato, and Joosen in a set of extensive
empirical studies [7]. They also state that it “[. . . ] mainly
focuses on the privacy of the data subject (i.e. the person the
data are about). Rather than focusing on internal processes and
flows[. . . ]” [8]. This is where STPA-Priv could be useful with
its top-down approach.
III. STPA-PRIV
To understand what STPA-Priv is we first describe its
origin and what ideas constituted to the development of STPA.
Then we introduce the STPA-Priv extension and available tool
support.
A. STAMP and STPA
Leveson developed a new accident model based on sys-
tem and control theory called STAMP (Systems-Theoretic
Accident Modeling and Processes) [9]. In STAMP, accidents
are considered results from inadequate enforcement of safety
constraints in system design, development and operations.
STAMP treats safety as control problem rather than component
failures. In STAMP, the system is seen as a set of control
components which interact with each other. This helps to
create models of systems which cover human, technology,
software, and environmental factors, such as governmental
policy [9]. Therefore, STAMP considers accidents not only
arising from individual component failures but also from
the interaction among system components. In other words,
accidents occur when component failures, external disturbances
and/or dysfunctional interactions among system components
are not adequately handled by the safety control system [9].
Based on STAMP, a new method for hazard analysis called
STPA (System-Theoretic Process Analysis) was developed to
identify hazards existing in the system and providing so-called
safety constraints to mitigate those hazards.
STPA has been extended to support the security analysis
based on systems theory. Young and Leveson [10] developed an
approach called STPA-Sec (STPA for security) which extends
the STPA safety analysis with security aspects.
B. STPA-Priv Extension
Shapiro extended STPA-Sec to be used for the elicitation of
privacy risks [2]. His proposed extension is called STPA-Priv.
It combines the existing advantages of STPA with an extension
for privacy analysis. This includes the top-down principle of
STPA to be able to handle complex socio-technical systems.
The steps of STPA are in principle the same in STPA-Priv,
only their terminology was changed. Losses or accidents in
traditional STPA are always related to a loss of human life,
injuries or destruction of expensive hardware. However, privacy
violations primarily do not lead to accidents which threaten
human life, but lead to embarrassing, awkward and adverse
situations, or emotional damage in general, for individuals.
This is why losses and accidents are renamed to adverse
consequences in respect to privacy. An important property of
STPA-Priv is that it can cope with open-loop controls, that is
controls that are not able to provide feedback to their controlling
entity (e. g. privacy policies are there but can not alway be
known if the user really read them [12]). An overview of the
needed steps and comparison between STPA-Priv, STPA-Sec,
and STPA is depicted in Table I.
Wuyts and Joosen define four different knowledge classes for
privacy research [11]. They are methodology/process, Principle,
Guideline and Pattern. Currently we would classify STPA-
Priv as a methodology/process. But as we will learn in this
exploratory study, it has to be augmented by at least a threat
catalog for a useful analysis so it might also belong to the
pattern category.
C. Tool Support with XSTAMPP
The application of a method is easier with a tool that gives
hints or makes the input/output of artifacts easier. XSTAMPP
as open-source platform supports engineers to perform safety,
security and privacy analysis by providing a mostly tabular user
interface for each STPA step and reference capabilities between
the artifacts. It also has graphical control structure modeling.
XSTAMPP supports software engineers in performing safety-
based testing and verification activities based on the STPA
safety analysis results. We will use XSTAMPP to support our
application of STPA-Priv on a reasonable complex scenario
which we will describe next.
IV. SCENARIO DESCRIPTION (EHEALTH)
Since chronic diseases such as diabetes mellitus are on the
rise, the healthcare system has to face high treatment costs and
overburdened physicians. As a consequence, novel treatment
methods are badly needed. eHealth, i. e., the usage of common
Privacy violations can still lead to political or other kinds of persecution
and should therefore not be neglected.
STPA-Priv STPA-Sec STPA
Step 0 Fundamentals Define System Goals and Description
Define Adverse Consequences Define Losses Define Accidents
Define Vulnerabilities Define Hazards
Link Adverse Consequences to Vulnerabilities Link Losses to Vulnerabilities Link Accidents to Hazards
Specify Privacy Constraints Specify Security Constraints Specify Safety Constraints
Specify Design Requirements
Create Control Structure Model
Step 1 Control Actions Derive Control Actions
Define Privacy-compromising Control Actions Define Unsecure Control Actions Define Unsafe Control Actions
Corresponding Privacy Constraints Corresponding Security Constraints Corresponding Safety Constraints
Step 2 Causal Analysis Derive Causal Factors
TABLE I
OVERVIEW OF THE STEPS OF THE STPA-PRIV METHOD WITH COMPARISON TO THE ORIGINAL STPA AND STPA-SEC.
computing systems such as PCs or smartphones for health
care, is such a method. With eHealth the patients are able to
perform periodic screenings at home instructed only by their
computing system. eHealth applications can even be tailored
to almost any given medical condition [14]. However, eHealth
is not just able to reduce treatment costs. With the help of
serious games it is possible to integrate required therapeutic
procedures into the daily routines of child patients. That way,
the young patients are able to cope with their illness much
better [15].
Kno¨ll develops in cooperation with the Olgahospital Stuttgart,
a children’s hospital in Germany, an idea for a serious game
for children suffering from diabetes [16]. In this smartphone
game the player, i. e., the patient, has to enter his or her blood
sugar values regularly. Each of these entries is enriched with
the current location of the player and a timestamp. The game
somehow has to motivate the player not only to check his or
her blood sugar level regularly but also to do this at varying
locations. From the player’s point of view, this concept is
beneficial as s/he has to monitor the blood sugar level anyhow.
Accordingly the game is both a motivation as well as a reminder.
Additionally physicians benefit from such a game. Normally
patients have to keep a handwritten diabetes diary and the
physicians have to review the diary. Yet, these diaries contain
wrong or incomplete data and they are difficult to decipher. The
game-based approach is able to create an electronic diabetes
diary without the drawbacks of the paper-based version.
However, there are even more stakeholders for such a game.
Due to the augmented health data, also urban planners can
profit from health games. With the help of physicians, they are
able to identify unhealthy places in town, i. e., places which
have a bad influence on the patient’s health. Based on this
knowledge, correlations between architectural characteristics
(e. g., crowded streets) and health condition changes can be
deduced [17].
Both, the location as well as the current time can be captured by the sensors
built in the smartphone.
It is obvious that not every involved party requires all of
the captured data. Especially since this kind of data is highly
sensitive private data. Therefore it is strongly recommended
to restrict the party’s data access individually. E. g., the urban
planners only need to know which locations have an influence
on the health condition. However, they need no access to any
actual health data or even data from which they are able to
draw inferences about the patient. The physicians on the other
hand need access to the whereabouts of a patient only in
case of an emergency. Such a scenario requires fine-granular
privacy mechanisms which assure the best quality of service
and conceal as much private data as possible. The studies
mentioned above have not taken privacy into consideration; the
participants had to agree to the unrestricted usage of their data
by the involved parties. We assume that this scenario covers
several different privacy risks that can be found in similar
eHealth scenarios as well.
V. APPLICATION OF STPA-PRIV
In the following we want to systematically analyze this
scenario using STPA-Priv for any privacy risks the involved
parties have to be aware of and how these risks can be mitigated
or even prevented. The analysis follows the steps listed in
Table I.
Step 0: Fundamentals
1) Define System Goals and Description: Important goals
of the system have to be kept in mind in all further steps, as
the system must always fulfill its goal. We can get important
information from the system description, such as the involved
parties that share or process data. In this scenario we come
up with the following initial involved parties: Child (as in
the person that has diabetes), parents, physician, insurance
company, smart device manufacturer, and other players of the
game (other children with diabetes).
2) Define Adverse Consequences: Finding and defining
adverse consequences in our system is an important step
of STPA-Priv and requires experts that know the scenario
and its entities. However, it is not necessary to know the
implementation of each component, since STPA is a top-down
approach and works at the system and component level.
This step can and should be augmented by a systematic
catalog of privacy threats, such as LINDDUN privacy threat
tree catalog [6] or Calo’s subjective/objective privacy harms
[18] (as Shapiro used in his initial proposal of STPA-Priv [2]).
LINDDUN has been analyzed in empirical studies that tested
how different threat models affect the traceability of different
privacy threats. These studies showed that this threat model is
easy to learn but still provides reliable results in comparison
to experts [7]. Its threat trees have been considered useful in
practice. It provides privacy analysis methods as well, however,
we only utilized their threat tree in our case. It offers privacy
threats from different categories: linkability, identifiability, non-
repudiation, detectability, information disclosure, unwareness,
and non-compliance. Threats from these categories are then
used to find adverse consequences.
Each adverse consequence can be triggered by one or more
system states together with environmental conditions of the
system. These are called vulnerabilities or vulnerable system
states. Vulnerabilities are system states that are under the
system’s control, whereas adverse consequences themselves
are not controllable. This is why vulnerable system states
have to be prevented. Elaborating adverse consequences is the
counterpart to accidents in original STPA. Here we can use the
knowledge from the previous step about the involved parties
and their relationships.
As an example, the relationship between the child and the
smart device manufacturer is of commercial interest. Exchanged
data includes analytics data and crash report information.
Applying different privacy threats from LINDDUN threat tree
create the following adverse consequence: The user is not
aware of active analytics program and is therefore suspect
to surveillance. This is a result of the general privacy threat
unawareness. Another example is other players can estimate
health state of player which is caused by information disclosure
[2]. More adverse consequences are listed in table II.
3) Define Vulnerabilities: Now that we have a list of adverse
consequences we need to define corresponding vulnerable
system states that can lead to these adverse consequences [2]
[9]. Depending on the adverse consequence we can define an
abstract system state description for each adverse consequence
that would be exploitable, respectively that can lead to the
adverse consequence. At this point we have no list or model
of possible system states. Therefore, we assume we have to
describe them in a textual form with our domain knowledge
and the knowledge of the system and they do not have to be
actual states in the implemented components of the system.
The adverse consequence the user is not aware of active
analytics program and is therefore suspect to surveillance can
be caused by the system states privacy policy has not been
presented to user and user ignored privacy policy and did not
read it. A list of identified vulnerable system states of our
scenario is listed in table II where we also state the adverse
consequence and the LINDDUN category.
4) Link Adverse Consequences to Vulnerabilities: As already
inferable from the table II the vulnerable system states should
be linked to all the adverse consequences that can be caused
by them. This has to be done iteratively for each adverse
consequence.
5) Specify Privacy Constraints: Privacy constraints ensure
that vulnerable system states do not occur. They are created
basically by negation of the vulnerabilities. As an example,
the vulnerability General therapy data includes detailed blood
sugar values can be converted to the privacy constraint Exported
therapy information must not include detailed blood sugar
values. (Here we should be more specific what detailed means,
but for this exploration it should be enough).
If we make sure all the privacy constraints are en-
forced/followed correctly then the previously defined adverse
consequences are prevented. This is why we want to find control
actions that could violate these constraints in the following
steps.
6) Specify Design Requirements: This step is skipped for
this exploration.
7) Create Control Structure Model: An important part of
STPA is the system Control Structure Model. It contains the
processes that are to be controlled using a so called feedback-
loop. The feedback loop is created by attaching a sensor that
checks the process and reports to a controller. The controller
then evaluates the sensor value and uses an actuator to control
the process again. The terminology originates from the safety
anaylsis where the system is build up of these parts. It is not
yet defined how these elements have to be used in the privacy
analysis. When analyzing existing systems we can eventually
use their existing control structure diagram in this step. If a
new system is analyzed we have to create a control structure
diagram.
The control structure diagram of our scenario is depicted
in fig. 1. There are many involved parties with different
relationships and interests: The child plays an important role; it
uses the smart device. The smart device is capable of measuring
the blood sugar level and can locate its position using the
GPS. Whenever a blood sugar change occurs, the blood sugar
controller is triggered. This controller decides whether an
action is necessary: It could notify the game controller to
motivate the patient to inject insulin in exchange for in-game
rewards, and it can notify the parent alert controller in case
of an extreme blood sugar value to get help for the child. The
game controller also includes a high score controller which
can share scores with other players of the game. Physicians
can access long-time measurements to be able to discuss and
improve the therapy. Analytics data, usage data and crash
reports of the smart device are sent out to the smart device
manufacturer to improve their service or the device. The health
insurance company is interested in general usage data to be
able to see if participants are using the smart device on a
regularly basis and correctly. Using this technology more often
leads to better insulin injection results and a more stable health
condition of the child. This decreases the expenses of the
insurance for a specific patient and can therefore decrease their
Adverse Privacy Consequences LINDDUN Category Vulnerable System States
User is not aware of active analytics program and is
therefore suspect to surveillance.
Unawareness Privacy policy has not been presented to user.
User ignored privacy policy and did not read it.
Insurance company has access to detailed blood-sugar
values.
Information Disclosure Detailed blood-sugar values are sent to insurance com-
pany as part of the general therapy data.
User decides to stop using the device and sends it back
to the insurance company without deleting its content.
Insurance company has access to detailed location data. Information Disclosure Detailed location data is sent to insurance company as
part of the general therapy data.
User decides to stop using the device and sends it back
to the insurance company without deleting its content.
High score allows assumptions on health state.
Smart device company has access to detailed blood-sugar
values.
Information Disclosure Analytics data includes detailed blood-sugar values.
User sends device to company for repair without deleting
its content.
Smart device company has access to detailed location
data.
Information Disclosure Analytics data includes detailed location data.
User sends device to company for repair without deleting
its content.
Other players can track location of player. Information Disclosure High scores include location information.
Other players can estimate health state of player. Information Disclosure, Linkability High score allows assumptions on health state.
Other players can see identity (name, address) of player. Identifiability, Unawareness High scores include personal information of player.
Physician receives detailed location information. Information Disclosure Long-term health information includes location data.
Parents can track location of children. Information Disclosure Parent alert system always provides location information.
Urban planners can identify player from provided gps-
and health-data.
Identifiability Submitted data sets include information about player.
Submitted data sets include pattern, that can identify
player.
Urban planners can link individual data sets so they know
that they come from the same player.
Linkability Submitted data sets include information about player.
Submitted data sets include pattern, that can identify
individuals.
TABLE II
ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES AND THEIR VULNERABILITIES IN OUR EHEALTH SCENARIO. THEIR LINDDUN CATEGORY SHOWS BY WHICH KIND OF PRIVACY
THREAT THEY ARE CAUSED.
insurance contribution. The creation of this control structure
is not easy and requires a lot of domain knowledge. Also it
requires decisions on where the system boundaries are and
how detailed components are modeled.
Step 1: Control Actions
1) Derive Control Actions: The created control structure
diagram is used as a basis to derive the existing control actions.
They can be taken directly from the model.
2) Define Privacy-Compromising Control Actions and 3)
Specify Corresponding Privacy Constraints: More important
are the privacy-compromising control actions which violate
privacy constraints when being executed. The goal of this
step is to find all privacy-compromising control actions. In
the end, these privacy-compromising control actions are the
flaw of our system and need to be tamed by the engineers.
Each privacy constraint is enforced by a controlling component
(see fig. 1). According to STPA-Priv, privacy-compromising
control actions can be classified in one of the following four
categories: 1. Not providing the control action, when it should
be provided. 2. Providing the control action, when it should not
be provided. 3. Providing the control action too early, too late
or in wrong order. 4. Stopping the control action or applying
it too long. Yet we feel unsure whether these four categories
apply for privacy. Still, it depends on how the control actions
are modeled and/or actually executed.
When looking at the privacy constraints, we have to find the
appropriate control actions from the control structure in fig. 1
that is responsible for ensuring the privacy constraint. As an
example, the control action send analytics data is responsible
for ensuring that the privacy policy has been presented to
the user, that the user must read the privacy policy, that
analytics data must not include location information and that
analytics data must not include blood sugar values. These
cases are then listed in their appropriate category, caused by
the privacy-compromising control action send analytics data.
This results in vulnerabilities like sending analytics data causes
vulnerability when user is not aware of analytics program or
sending analytics data causes vulnerability when data includes
blood sugar information.
Step 2: Causal Analysis - Derivation of Causal Factors
The previous step generated a list of privacy-compromising
control actions that can violate privacy constraints and therefore
potentially cause vulnerable system states. They describe what
could go wrong. The last step of STPA-Priv concludes scenarios
that describe how a privacy-compromising control action
might be executed. This is not limited to simple components,
but can occur in conjunction with components and control
actions within the whole socio-technical system. This is also
often referred to as worst case scenario. We have to look at
vulnerabilities that are caused by these control actions to find
causal scenarios. For example he control action Send analytics
data can cause different vulnerable states, such as sending
analytics data when user is not aware of analytics program.
Fig. 1. The system with its control structure in a diagram after several iterations. The patient itself, their parents, the smart device producing company, the
physician, the insurance company and other players of the game. Different controllers within the watch ensure that data sets are only redirected to specific
participants if appropriate requirements are met.
This can happen when the user did not read the privacy policy,
or the agreement has not been made available to the user.
These are then the first causal scenarios. The next vulnerability
is providing analytics data when data includes detailed blood
sugar values. This can be caused by a scenario in which the
usage controller filters data incorrectly.
Control actions that can be referred to a causal scenario
require a risk management response. This can be a privacy
policy or terms of use that all parties and components must
comply to or other kinds of actions. These are not part of the
analysis method and are of course system specific.
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This was a very brief description of the application of STPA-
Priv to a complex eHealth scenario.
The application of STPA-Priv is straightforward. There
are a lot of steps which build up on each other, but they
follow a simple logic: Define privacy parameters (like adverse
consequences), find vulnerabilities, negate vulnerabilities to
create constraints, and then find control actions that violate
these constraints. During the application we often recognized
that we might have to add some things to previous steps
and then step through all following steps again. This was
no problem so STPA-Priv can and should also be applied
iteratively if knowledge about the system is gained during
or after the application. Despite this simple logic we found
the application not easy. This is because to understand what
we have to do in each step, a lot of additional information
about the process has to be gathered. This information, for
example how to choose a threat catalog or how to create
the control structure model, is currently not included in the
available literature. The most convenient place would be if
the XSTAMPP tool would offer this information to the user
e. g. in form of a tutorial for each step. Anyway a formal
documentation of the method would be a good start. Currently
XSTAMPP offers for the steps that require listing artifacts (like
adverse consequences or control actions) only very humble
tabular input forms. Nevertheless, a nice feature of XSTAMPP
is the visual editor for the control structure model. We know
that for the safety analysis this control structure representation
can already been used to formally validate the model against
the safety constraints. But this is currently not tailored for
the privacy analysis. Also, it misses vital information on how
the control structure model components have to be used in a
privacy analysis.
Next steps: We want to compare STPA-Priv to the LIND-
DUN privacy threat modeling to find out if one method finds
privacy risk that the other method does not and/or if one method
requires less effort and resources. Also, we want to create
formal documentation for STPA-Priv and make XSTAMPP
more self-contained by adding its own privacy threat catalog.
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